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A pioneer in the theory of pluralistic casuistry, the idea that there are almost as many facets to moral choices as there are cases that call for choices, Baruch Brody takes issue with conventional bioethical wisdom and challenges the rigid principalism of contemporary bioethics. His views have been seen as controversial, but they are firmly held, and convincingly argued-all of which have led him to be one of the most widely discussed and highly admired bioethicists of our time. He argues for the fundamental distinction between active and passive euthanasia, for a need to reconceptualize appro

— Moral Theory and Moral Judgments in Biomedical Ethics -- Section I / Deriving Utilitarian Consequences -- Utilitarian Goals and Kantian Constraints (or: Always True to You, Darling, in my Fashion) -- Utilitarians Among the Optimists -- Utilitarianism and the Informed Consent Requirement (or: Should Utilitarians be Allowed on Medical Research Ethical Review Boards?) -- Reply to Ruddick and Reiman -- Section II / Natural Right Casuistry -- Moral Rights and Causal Casuistry -- Death by Omission -- Coffee and Casuistry: It Doesn't Matter Who Caused What -- Section III / Marx's Theory: Deriving Moral Implications -- Marxism and Moral Judgment -- Marx, Moral Judgment, and Medical Ethics: Commentary on Buchanan -- Section IV / Christian Casuistry -- Reconciling the Practice of Reason: Casuistry in a Christian Context -- Christianity in a Social Context: Practical Reasoning and Forgiveness -- Section V / From Theory to Praxis -- The Relation of Moral Theory to Moral Judgments: A Kantian View -- Justification in Ethics -- Theory and Practice in Ethics -- Notes on Contributors.

AbstractThe Helsinki Declaration, adopted in 1964, became a landmark document for research ethics and for the protection of human subjects. Since then, additional complexities have emerged. The advance in biomedical research protocols and medical technologies dictates further discussion of the emerging concerns in this field. This article explores the following concerns related to research with no consent given in advance, using incompetent subjects, international participation, and the role of independent research committees.

Public statements by various international groups emphasize
that decisions to undergo genetic screening, either for
disease-carrier status or for predisposition-to-disease status,
and decisions about the use of the resulting information should
be made voluntarily by the party to be screened. For example,
the World Medical Association, in its Declaration on the Human
Genome Project, says, "One should respect the will of
persons screened and their right to decide about participation
and about the use of the information obtained." Giving
this principle a name, "voluntarism," the Council for
International Organizations of Medical Sciences, in its Declaration
of Inuyama (the host city for the conference), announced that
"voluntarism should be the guiding principle in the provision
of genetic services.

This paper will attempt to defend the thesis that it is impossible to understand the proper role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic society without examining certain fundamental questions about the proper roles of the state and about the rights and obligations of owners of private property. It will defend that thesis by presenting arguments for four subordinate theses: (a) there are historical and philosophical reasons for being skeptical about the role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic state; (b) these reasons can be met by certain familiar responses, but these responses are not fully satisfactory; (c) certain radical libertarian views, and more moderate versions of those views, would provide a basis for an alternative understanding of the role of private philanthropy in a free and democratic state; (d) whether or not one accepts those views, one can also better understand that role if one adopts a view of the state which emphasizes its role in the promotion of the virtues.(1) Historical and Philosophical DoubtsThe skeptical challenge to the claim that there is an important role for private philanthropy in a free and democratic state can be put very simply. It is the challenge that the emergence of strong but democratic states, with the concurrent emergence of a proper understanding of the extensive nature of legitimate state functions, has undercut the need for private philanthropy and its corresponding favorable tax treatment. It is the further claim that these developments, both historical and conceptual, have left private philanthropy with no significant role.

It seems to me that those who place great value on the right to human freedom can be badly divided on the question of the use of force by states to defend the liberties of those who are not citizens of that particular state. Concerned about the liberties to be defended, they might be enthusiastic supporters of the use of such force by liberty-loving countries throughout the world. Concerned about the liberties that might be violated when the state marshals its forces for use internationally, they might adopt a more isolationist approach to this issue. This paper is an attempt to help clarify this conflict by looking at some of the philosophical issues it raises. Because I wish to avoid factual debates about current conflicts, I will give no real-life examples. However, they are on my mind, and I hope the reader will keep them in mind as well.

I will, in this paper, set out the philosophical foundations and the basic structure of a new theory of justice. I will argue that both these foundations and the theory which is based upon them are intuitively attractive and theoretically sound. Finally, I will argue that both are supported by the fact that they lead to attractive implications such as the following:(1) One can justify at least some governmental redistributive programs which presuppose that those receiving the wealth have a right to it, without being committed to any form of egalitarianism.(2) The justification for these redistributive programs respects property entitlements; it argues, in effect, that property entitlements and rights to some redistribution of wealth presuppose each other, rather than being in conflict with each other.(3) The amount of redistribution to which each indigent person is entitled is directly proportional to the wealth of the society in question (the wealthier the society, the greater the entitlement) and inversely proportional to the number of indigents in the society in question (the more indigents, the less to which each is entitled).There are at this stage in the history of Western thought few entirely new ideas in philosophy. Too much has been written about the important issues to allow for entirely new approaches. My theory is no exception to these generalizations, for it draws upon the tradition of John Locke, of the agrarian reforms such as Paine, Spence, and Ogilvie, and of libertarian writers such as Robert Nozick. Nevertheless, I will argue, the resulting theory is a significant advance over the ideas of these earlier writers.

A familiar argument purports to show that it is always wrong for an expectant woman to have an abortion: (1) from the moment of conception a fetus is a human being with the same rights to life as any other human being, (2) it is always wrong to take the life of an innocent human being, (3) therefore it is always wrong to have an abortion. This is a response to an article by J. J. Thompson (see SA 21:2/73G2053), who criticized the above argument by challenging (2). She argued that a woman has the right to secure an abortion even if (1) is true, although there are cases in which it would be positively indecent to exercise this right. It is shown that assuming that the fetus is human & that one should look at abortion as a standard case of self-defense, even when the fetus' continued existence poses a threat to the life of the woman, she probably has no right, as an act of self-defense, to an abortion. When one has a choice between using all or part of a woman's body to save her or the fetus, the fact that it is her body gives her precedence. But in the case of an abortion one chooses between saving the woman by taking the life of the fetus & not taking the life of the fetus, thereby failing to save the woman. Given that choice, her rights to her body have no relevance. It is held that an abortion would be justified if, were the abortion not performed, both the woman & the fetus would die soon, & if we either cannot save the fetus or have determined by a fair random procedure that it is the woman that should be saved. E. Weiman.